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involving self-realization through nonselfsacrificial existential necessity, and then show how 
in cases of reactive heroic action this necessity is best understood in predispositional embodied 
terms, such that the agent may be said to quite literally incarnate certain generally accepted 
norms of the intersubjective ethical context. I then briefly sketch out how this same kind of 
embodied necessity can be seen in proactive cases, albeit with the difference that here it has to 
do with realizing the ‘validity surplus’ of that ethical context, that is, with the expansion of the 
scope of application of its norms. Unlike the norms enacted in reactive cases, this expansion is 
initially not generally accepted, and in this way proactive heroism is conceptually tied to the 
idea of immanent social progress. By way of conclusion, I comment very briefly on how this 
relates to questions concerning the wider cultivation of heroism. 
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1 SELF-REALIZATION AND VALIDITY SURPLUS IN PROACTIVE 
HEROISM 
My aim in these brief remarks is to provide a fairly succinct outline of an approach to 
understanding heroic action in embodied terms, that is, as a phenomenon of human 
embodiment or corporeality. I’ll mainly discuss reactive heroism, that is, cases in which a 
heroic action is a more or less spontaneous response to some occurrence or event. But my 
real interest lies with cases of proactive (or social) heroism, which typically involve 
protracted courses of purposeful action. My motivation is to lend rigorous support to the 
general idea of ‘the banality of heroism’ (Franco and Zimbardo 2006), that is, heroism’s 
being a phenomenon of universal everydayness, and I believe that the single most important 
way to do so is to offer a compelling reconceptualization of proactive heroism in corporeal 
terms.  
Let me begin with a few preliminary remarks.  
In one sense, the claim that heroism is an embodied phenomenon is perfectly trivial—
heroic action, like any kind of action, is obviously an embodied phenomenon inasmuch as it 
is only instantiated by embodied agents. But there is a much deeper significance to the claim. 
Broadly speaking, human action in general has traditionally been understood as issuing 
primarily from self-conscious processes of reflective deliberation, with the mind ‘piloting’ 
the body like a ship (to invoke the well-known Cartesian metaphor). More recently, however, 
this top-down view of action has been challenged as significantly misrepresenting what is 
actually going on in at least many forms of human action, alternative accounts of which have 
been proposed that instead foreground the role played by pre-reflective and habitual 
dimensions of the agent’s corporeality. It is in this precognitive sense – which, while clearly 
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related to biological facticity, is nonetheless strictly irreducible to it – that I propose to 
consider heroism. 
The analysis here will be primarily conceptual and phenomenological, rather than 
empirical in the ordinary sense. The main reason for this has to do with the fact that heroism 
science is still at an early stage in its development (cf. Efthimiou and Allison 2018), and its 
central concept – namely, heroism – remains shaped and informed by conflicting and 
possibly even mutually inconsistent intuitions. This is an observation, not a criticism—
comparable situations are not atypical in emerging new areas of the human and social 
sciences. But just as in any other area, it is something that needs to be addressed in order to 
make scientific progress, even if this means that some existing intuitions concerning heroism 
will have to be revised or dismissed.  
I am especially interested here in our intuitions concerning just what it is about heroism 
that so grips our attention and elicits such strong approbation. On the one hand, the idea of 
the egalitarian banality or universal everydayness of heroism seems – correctly, in my view – 
to have gained widespread support. Yet at the same time, there remain many vestiges of older 
views of heroism that hold it up as something quite exceptional and even elitist, in a way that 
is not dissimilar to a child’s veneration of fictional superheroes. So even if it is widely 
agreed, for example, that selflessly rescuing others in situations of, say, systematic genocide, 
professional firefighting, and subway-platform mishaps are all cases of heroic action, it is by 
no means clear what they have in common. What is the object of heroic ap-probation—is it 
the agent herself, or the action per se? If the former, then can there be heroism without heroic 
action, that is, can one be a ‘hero in waiting’?2 If the latter, then does heroism have more to 
                                                                    
2 Philip Zimbardo often uses this expression, particularly in connection with the Heroic Imagination Project 
(https://www.heroicimagination.org/). 
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do with the intentions behind the action, or rather with its actual consequences? Can one be 
an incompetent hero, or an accidental one?  
Questions of this sort typically prompt conflicting and confused answers. The main 
reason for this is that the shift in our thinking toward the banality of heroism is at odds with 
traditional (top-down) thinking about human agency. Simply put, the question boils down to 
this: if heroism is a phenomenon of universal everydayness, then what’s the big deal? The 
upshot of my remarks will be that we can formulate a more coherent and useful concept of 
heroism on the basis of an embodied (or, if you like, bottom-up) approach—that such an 
approach can better enable us to capture the sense in which heroic action is banal, even in the 
diverse forms that it may take, while at the same time clarifying the grounds for the strong 
approbation that we ordinarily (and quite fittingly) assign to it. This will go hand-in-hand 
with a distinction between heroism and what I shall call saintism, where the latter denotes 
those cases exhibiting the exceptionality that contrasts with heroic banality. This distinction 
between heroes and saints will prove to be extremely helpful with regard to clarifying the 
muddy intuitive waters concerning the sorts of action in question here. 
The principal reason why my discussion is not empirical in any straightforward sense, 
then, is simply that it is undertaking to reexamine just what heroism is, and in advance of any 
such basic reconceptualization, it remains, strictly speaking, an open question as to which 
observable actions or behaviors are in fact instantiations of relevant phenomena, and thus 
which available studies, if any, can be relied upon. New empirical studies could, of course, at 
least in principle, be designed and conducted on the basis of the reconceptualization that I 
will lay out, in order to test it. I’m not sure whether that could be done in practice (or within 
the ethical limits of human research), but in any case, we’re not at that point yet. 
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My discussion will unfold across four main steps: (1) I will first make a conceptual case 
for construing heroic action in general as involving self-realization through a kind of 
nonselfsacrificial existential necessity. (2) I then show how in cases of reactive heroic action 
this necessity is best understood in predispositional embodied terms, such that the agent may 
be said to quite literally incarnate certain generally accepted norms of the intersubjective 
ethical context (or ethical habitus).3  (3) I will then briefly sketch out how this same kind of 
embodied necessity can be seen as obtaining in proactive cases, albeit with the difference that 
here it has to do with realizing the ‘validity surplus’ of that ethical context, that is, with the 
expansion of the scope of application of its norms.4 Unlike the norms enacted in reactive 
cases, this expansion is initially not generally accepted, and in this way proactive heroism is 
tied conceptually and normatively to the idea of immanent social progress. (4) By way of 
conclusion, I comment briefly on how this relates to questions pertaining to the wider 
cultivation of heroism.5 
2 HEROISM AS NONSELFSACRIFICIAL EXISTENTIAL NECESSITY 
This first step in the discussion is primarily a matter of conceptual analysis. The main claim 
here is that the confused intuitions referred to above are sustained by the misconception that 
heroic action is supererogatory. In moral theory, supererogation refers to actions that are 
morally praiseworthy but not morally required—e.g., one receives moral praise for generous 
acts of charity, but these are optional in the sense that one is not morally blamed for not 
engaging in such acts. Supererogatory actions are thus simply those that go above and beyond 
one’s moral duty.  
                                                                    
3 My use of the term ‘habitus’ is guided primarily by the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977). 
4 I am borrowing the term ‘validity surplus’ from Axel Honneth’s theory of social recognition (2003: 186). 
5 Some of these points are dealt with more fully in Smyth (2018a) and (2018b). 
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Now, it does seem to make good intuitive sense to regard heroic action as 
supererogatory—it is certainly praiseworthy, but not normatively expected. The problem, 
however, is that this would imply that heroic action involves self-sacrifice. This claim could 
be argued on the grounds that moral action in general is self-sacrificial in the sense that the 
basic point of the other-regarding considerations of morality is to place limits on purely self-
interested behavior. Without much difficulty, however, such limits can be seen in terms of 
enlightened self-interest—I choose to act morally because the option to act otherwise is in 
fact ultimately detrimental to my self-interest. But what about supererogatory action? Such 
action can-not be regarded in that way because, ex hypothesi, the degree of self-sacrifice that 
it involves exceeds the threshold of what is normatively expected. It follows that what is 
morally praiseworthy about supererogation has precisely to do with its self-sacrificial 
character.  
Here we must note an implicit assumption to the effect that the very idea of self-sacrifice 
implies its contingency—something can only be a matter of self-sacrifice if there was in fact 
a more self-interested (or less selfless) option available. In general, moral action is only 
genuinely moral on condition that one could have acted otherwise. And the same holds for 
supererogation in particular—such action must be freely chosen, even if the alter-native 
option was simply to refrain from the action in question. In other words, what is morally 
praiseworthy about supererogatory action is precisely the fact that one freely chooses to 
engage in self-sacrificial behavior—we praise someone who engages in supererogation 
because she acted in that way but she didn’t have to, that is, it is implicitly assumed as a 
necessary condition of such approbation that she could have acted otherwise, including 
through simple omission. 
It goes without saying that this condition obtains in most cases of human action. But it 
certainly does not obtain in all cases. For there are cases of action in which the agent is un-
7 
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able not to act in a certain way. Crucially, this need not be due to any external necessity, but 
could stem rather from an internal necessity rooted in her own character. Such necessity need 
not therefore undermine or otherwise compromise the agent’s autonomy. Indeed, Bernard 
Williams noted how certain incapacities can be constitutive of one’s character, and that ‘to be 
an expression of character is perhaps the most substantial way in which an action can be 
one’s own’ (1981: 130; cf. 1993). Similarly, Kyle Fruh has recently expressed how such 
incapacities can be seen ‘not as constraints imposed on an agent, but as expressions of the 
core characteristics of the agent’ (2017: 32). So while in such cases it may certainly appear to 
an external third-person observer that the agent is choosing to act in a certain way over the 
equally possible option of refraining from so acting, the reality of the situation could be that 
she has no meaningful choice to make at all, and yet it is nonetheless still fully a matter of her 
authentic self-realization.  
My contention is that we should understand heroism in this way. That is, we should 
recognize that the assumption of contingency does not hold in cases of heroic action, and thus 
deny, outward appearances notwithstanding, that heroic action is a kind of moral 
supererogation. To be clear, a certain degree of conceptual stipulation is involved here, but 
unavoidably so—it does us no good to carry on with confused intuitions, and we need to 
straighten them out. My suggestion is that we focus on the underlying intentional structure of 
actions that appear to be instances of supererogatory self-sacrifice, and give conceptual 
articulation to the fundamental difference that resides there.  
Take, for example, the action of selflessly rescuing someone who has fallen off a sub-
way platform. In principle, this action could emerge in two fundamentally different ways. On 
the one hand, the agent might have engaged in a more or less reflective process of de-
liberation that issued in the decision to rescue the person rather than remain a bystander. This 
would make it an instance of supererogation, and the key point is that this agent could have 
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remained a bystander—she opted not to, and for this reason she justly merits high moral 
praise, for that is what makes the action self-sacrificial. But the option to do otherwise was, 
for her, existentially real. Otherwise put, that other option was not directly antithetical to her 
self-realization as an individual.  
On the other hand, the agent might not have engaged in any such process of deliberation. 
Indeed, agents’ self-reports of such action very often claim that they did what they did quite 
spontaneously, without any sort of moral reflection, and hence in a way that excluded any 
meaningful choice. But they are not thereby suggesting that they engaged in the action 
unfreely. In general, there need not be alternative possibilities in order for one’s action to 
count as free, and for one to be deemed responsible for it (Frankfurt 1969). And in the 
scenario under consideration here, the point after all is that the abstract possibility of not 
engaging in the action is negated by features of the agent’s own character—the action issues 
from what can be described as an existential incapacity to do otherwise. Unlike the first 
scenario, then, the bystander option is not a real possibility for this agent because here it 
would be directly antithetical to her individual self-realization. In contrast to the moral 
contingency of that first scenario, then, her action expresses a kind of existential necessity 
which, precisely as a species of necessity, is not self-sacrificial, since there is no option, let 
alone a more self-interested one, available to decline.  
There is thus a significant difference in terms of the underlying intentional structure of 
certain actions that might be outwardly indistinguishable. My claim is that we would do well 
to rethink heroism as lying on one side of this difference, because doing so could help to 
eliminate the problematic ways in which we still tend to exceptionalize heroism, and thus to 
come to clearer terms with its banality. My suggestion is that we reserve the concept of 
heroism for cases of the second sort, i.e., cases of nonselfsacrificial practical necessity, and 
maintain a distinction between this and supererogation proper, which, modifying a term from 
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moral theory, I shall designate as saintism. This distinction between (exceptional) saintism 
and (banal) heroism is not meant in any way to detract from either, and has no immediate 
implications with regard to relative degrees of approbation. The point is just to recognize that 
our intuitive confusions stem from the conflation of these fundamentally different models of 
normatively extraordinary action, and that such a distinction, even if it upsets some of our 
existing intuitions, can enable an important step of theoretical progress. 
3 REACTIVE HEROISM AS PREDISPOSITIONAL EMBODIED 
(ETHICAL) ACTION 
Whereas the traditional top-down model of action applies perfectly well to saintism, heroism 
as something banal calls for a bottom-up approach, and it is for this reason that we need to 
think about it in embodied terms. Here the analysis will be primarily phenomenological. It is 
by considering the phenomenology of embodied action that the nature of the necessity 
implied in heroism can be clarified. I shall first look at this in connection with reactive 
heroism, where it can be seen more easily, and then more briefly sketch out how it might 
apply to proactive heroism.  
The phenomenology of embodied action centers on a well-established multi-stage model 
of skill acquisition that was originally developed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980). The idea is 
that when one is acquiring certain skills – learning to ride a bicycle, for example, play a 
musical instrument, or speak a foreign language – the process necessarily begins quite self-
consciously, with a deliberate reflective focus on the relevant techniques and rules. For this 
reason, at the ‘novice’ stage one is generally slow and maladroit. But what occurs with 
further practice is the accretion or sedimentation of the relevant experiences in one’s 
embodied being (which certainly does not exclude the brain and central nervous system, but 
is not limited to that). In other words, skill is acquired as bodily habit, where this habituation 
is understood as the corporeal internalization of pre-reflective perceptual and motor 
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schemata. Progressing through stages up to a level of ‘expertise’, this habituation involves the 
development of a predispositionality that supports situationally transposable know-how. It is 
characteristic of highly developed skills to be sensitive and responsive to situational factors 
and thus correspondingly flexible or even improvisational—at the level of skillful expertise, 
even novel actions can be performed with an unselfconscious virtuosity and flow that cannot 
be understood as a matter of sheer automaticity, but only as the actualization of perceptual 
and motor predispositional habitualities.  
Two important aspects of this general process are to be noted. First, skill level is 
inversely proportional to the degree of reflection involved—whereas at the novice level one 
thinks a lot and performs badly, through habituation one’s skill level increases exactly to the 
extent to which the cognitive burdens are, so to speak, offloaded onto the body. One performs 
better the less one needs to think about it (hence the well-known injunction against 
‘overthinking’). Second, and relatedly, skill level is also inversely proportional to the 
experienced degree of contingency or optionality of one’s action. In most situations there is 
an optimal action or step to be taken, and central to increased skill is the ability to recognize 
this action immediately—the virtuosity and flow of expert behavior stem from the fact that 
here one typically does not waste time deliberating between different possibilities—one just 
sees what is to be done and does it. In other words, skillful expertise – cycling down a hilly 
path, for example, playing a complex concerto, or conversing with idiomatic fluency – 
typically involves a high degree of experienced necessity, although this necessity has clearly 
nothing to do with metaphysical determinism and in no way compromises the freedom of the 
agent.  
This model applies well to the sorts of individual action that we might typically consider 
in terms of the notion of skill. But it also applies much more broadly—in interpersonal terms, 
there are skill-like modes of comportment that comprise culturally shared ‘body techniques’, 
11 
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corporeal ‘styles’ or ‘idioms’ (Mauss 1936; Elias 2000 [1939]; Goffman 1971)—for example, 
forms of emotional expression, communicative gestures, and the norms of physical co-
presence in different settings. Pre-reflective bodily habituation in perceptual and motor terms 
can thus be seen as internalizing – or, if you like, incorporating – and hence coming quite 
literally to incarnate certain aspects of an individual’s social milieu.  
Inasmuch as such interpersonal skills have to do with how individuals relate to one 
another, it is but a small further step to recognize that certain actions pertaining to the ethical 
life of society exemplify this process particularly clearly. In very general terms, there is in 
any given social context a system of moral normativity that regulates the behavior of 
individuals for the common good by requiring a certain degree of other-regardingness, and it 
is the minimally altruistic compliance with these norms that merits normal moral 
approbation. Building upon the distinction drawn above, we can easily see that someone 
could fulfill her moral duty in two different ways: either in a saintly way, in which she 
engages in a process of deliberation and, after contemplating the options, reflectively chooses 
to act morally rather than not; or else in a heroic way, in which she spontaneously or 
habitually acts without reflection on the basis of an internalized ethical expertise (cf. Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1991; 2004).6 Sometimes we choose to do act morally, and sometimes we just 
do it.  
Although situations of moral deliberation and choice may strike us as paradigmatic of 
ethical life, I suspect that they are more exceptional than typical. For if we take a broad view, 
then it would seem that more of what goes on in everyday ethical coexistence corresponds to 
the habitual scenario, in which one’s ethical comportment relies upon ‘pre-reflective ethical 
know-how’ (DeSouza 2013) in a way that is strongly analogous to other forms of acquired 
                                                                    
6   Contrary to its usual connotation, as it is used here the term ‘expertise’ should not be taken as implying any 
high level of cognitive engagement—indeed, as discussed, quite the opposite is the case 
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skillful expertise. As a kind of ‘ethical second nature’ that we literally come to embody 
through socialization and interpersonal experience, it guides most of our quotidian 
interactions with others with the same sort of existential necessity, even while it may also 
provide the motivational and evaluative background for any more explicitly formulated moral 
intentions. 
It is in these terms that best sense can, I think, be made of reactive heroism. It is very 
common for agents in such cases to report that they felt no choice, that they simply acted, and 
that they did so just as anyone would do. From the perspective of the traditional 
understanding of human agency, such self-reports actually make it quite puzzling as to why 
praise is heaped upon these agents. For if someone acts on the basis of what amounts to an 
impersonal necessity, then even if the outcome is very positive, it is not clear why their action 
itself should be regarded so highly. Indeed, it seems scarcely to be an action at all, but rather 
just a natural event. There may even be a misguided tendency to regard it as a supernatural 
event, not unlike the action of a superhero, just to make sense of our glowing response to it.  
But now we can have an incomparably better understanding of reactive heroism as a 
matter of ethical expertise: all individuals internalize their society’s normative landscape to 
some extent, but some do this particularly well, and on this basis these individuals can see 
immediately what needs to be done, and they are predisposed spontaneously to perform even 
novel actions that instantiate those common norms. This can happen at any moment, but 
certain circumstances trigger an actualization of those habitualities in a way that leads to 
extraordinary actions that appear supererogatory, but which in fact remain instances of 
existential necessity. In this way, there is no essential difference between reactive heroism as 
enacted by ordinary individuals and, say, professional firefighters (or others) who have 
received specialized training (this just greatly reduces the bystander effect). Both cases 
exhibit extraordinary ordinariness in the sense that they literally embody aspects of a shared 
13 
BRYAN SMYTH                                                              SELF-REALIZATION AND VALIDITY SURPLUS IN PROACTIVE HEROISM 
Heroism Science: An Interdisciplinary Journal  ISSN 2573-7120 
ethical habitus. It is on account of how such action gives carnal expression to important 
values that we (i.e., the relevant social collectivity) share that makes it a matter of universal 
everydayness that is at the same time something highly estimable (at least for us).  
4 PROACTIVE HEROISM AS EMBODIED ACTION 
It is quite illuminating to account for reactive heroism along these lines, and in theoretical terms 
it is relatively easy to do so, inasmuch as the actions in question tend to be compact and well-
defined. But as stated above, my main interest here has to do with whether this account of 
embodied predispositionality and necessity might also apply to cases of proactive heroism. 
This question is key to the viability of the thesis of the banality of heroism. For if that banality 
does indeed imply this corporeal account, then unless that account applies to proactive cases, 
the category of heroism would be reduced to its reactive core, while all cases of seemingly 
supererogatory proactive comportment would indeed be instances of supererogation, or 
saintism, and social progress would be premised in a problematic way on self-sacrificial 
behavior (more on this below).  
So does the above account apply to proactive heroism? To pose the same question slightly 
differently: given the analysis of heroism in general as nonselfsacrificial existential necessity, 
could there possibly be such a thing as proactive heroism? Is that a coherent concept? And if 
so, then is it also best understood in embodied terms? I can only give a few brief indications 
here. 
First, there are some evident differences from reactive cases. For instance, unlike the latter, 
there is clearly a great deal of reflection in cases of proactive heroism. But what is important 
is the nature of this reflection—must it always be a matter of moral deliberation as in saintism? 
Extending the earlier discussion of existential necessities, it seems entirely plausible to imagine 
that in some cases the reflection in question is instead a matter of the disclosure to oneself of 
14 
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just such a characteristic internal necessity, that is, of an existential incapacity to act otherwise 
on the part of the agent herself. In other words – and this is an idea that I intend to develop in 
further work – the reflection undertaken in a case of proactive heroism amounts to a process of 
self-discovery and self-clarification of the fact that the agent’s self-realization is fully caught 
up in an extended existential ‘must’ rather than a series of moral ‘shoulds’. 
This would mean that there is a generally a much higher level of self-awareness in 
proactive as opposed to reactive cases of heroism. This difference makes for a more direct 
contrast with the supererogation characteristic of saintism, for which reason the denial of self-
sacrifice is even stronger in cases of proactive heroism. For in these cases, the agent has, at 
least in an abstract sense, far more opportunities to back out—the existential necessity involved 
is not a one-off thing, but is positively affirmed and reaffirmed over long periods.  
This difference resonates with a more basic similarity. With regard to both sorts of cases, 
the model of embodied habitual predispositionality affords the most compelling way of 
understanding how values, principles, and any other elements of the ethical habitus can in the 
first place be internalized so as to become stable and irreducible features of an individual’s 
character—how, in other words, the ‘integration of agency and communion’ (cf. Frimer et al 
2011) that is characteristic of heroism is actually achieved. In cases of reactive heroism this 
allows us to understand how dramatic instances of seemingly self-sacrificial ethical behavior 
can occur spontaneously, while in cases of proactive heroism it will allow us to understand 
the perseverance, the recurrently reaffirmed motivation, and the longitudinal continuity that 
characterize the agent’s endeavors over time. In both sorts of cases, though, the basic point is 
that it is literally true and not merely a suggestive piece of rhetoric to say that heroism is the 
embodiment of ethical commitment. 
So it does seem that the notion of proactive heroism is a viable one, that it can be 
construed along the lines of the embodied necessity originally evinced in reactive cases, and 
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thus that the conceptual distinction between heroism and saintism holds at the proactive level. 
Both figures are alike in terms of transcending the minimum threshold of normative 
expectation in a given social context. But whereas the saint is internally divided and turns to 
moral reasoning for guidance in resolving the tension of the normative contingency of the 
alternative possibilities she faces, the proactive hero embodies an undivided commitment to 
an internalized imperative, such that for her there really is no contingency to grapple with. 
In terms of the specific actions involved, proactive heroism and saintism may overlap. 
But the moral deliberation of saintism could also generate normative aspirations that fully 
transcend the given normative context. It is crucial to recognize that, as I have described it, 
proactive heroism does no such thing. Rather, owing to its embodied nature, heroism in 
general is bound to its ethical habitus. But this manifests differently in reactive and proactive 
cases. In the former, generally accepted norms are realized in a particularly intense way, and 
that is why virtually everyone applauds. The latter, however, has more to do with realizing 
the ‘validity surplus’ of that ethical habitus, that is, with the recognition that the implicit 
meaning and potential scope of application of its norms are broader than is actually the case 
currently, and with efforts that may be undertaken to extend their actual meaning and scope 
accordingly. Unlike the shared value that is affirmed in reactive cases, and which thereby 
merely reaffirms, albeit in dramatic fashion, the ethical status quo, this extension is initially 
not generally accepted, and in this way proactive heroism is essentially tied to the idea of 
immanent social progress. Saintism might also contribute to social progress. But unlike the 
way in which proactive heroism is anchored organically in the ethical habitus, in virtue of 
which it serves as a ‘loyal opposition’ that gives expression, not so much to who we are, as 
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with reactive heroism, but to who we are in fact becoming,7 the connection of saintism to its 
social context is fundamentally incidental and arbitrary.  
5 CULTIVATING HEROISM 
To reiterate a basic point, the above discussion aims to do nothing more than articulate a 
potentially helpful new conception of heroism in contradistinction to saintism. It does not yet 
make any claims about which actual actions, if any, would fall into which category. Where 
exactly the chips would fall in terms of heroism and saintism, and how this relates to current 
intuitions, remains to be seen. 
By way of conclusion, though, I simply wish to make the point that if, as seems likely, 
social progress is most effectively pursued immanently through the realization of an ethical 
validity surplus, rather than through moral aspirations that are incidental to (and possibly 
even transcend) the existing normative context, then the prospects of actually achieving it by 
cultivating appropriate sorts of actions on a broad scale are much better if pursued on a heroic 
rather than on a saintly basis. And this means on an embodied basis. For if within a given 
social context there are indeed latent but nonetheless real ethical tendencies that would 
exceed the existing moral baseline, then it seems entirely reasonable to suppose that enhanced 
prosocial behavior could be promoted much more effectively as a positive expression of 
individual self-realization through identification with those tendencies, even to the point of 
becoming an existential necessity, rather than as a moral aspiration to be achieved through 
self-sacrifice. This implies a focus on corporeal predispositionality. What exactly this will 
mean in more concrete terms, I reserve for future work. But it is in this way alone, I submit, 
that the idea of the banality of heroism is viable and coherent.  
                                                                    
7 I owe the expression ‘loyal opposition’ to discussion with Zeno Franco at the Second Biennial Heroism Science 
Conference in Richmond VA (October 2018). In my usage here, the ‘loyalty’ in question is to the deeper and 
possibly not yet fully realized – sense of the operative ethical principles in a given social context.  
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